A SHORTER WAY INTO THE SOURCE
The source, in brief.
This research brief brings together the registered abstract and publication details. It covers the metadata record, rather than a review of the full paper.
Abridged primary-source text [2]
LLM agents increasingly access external tools through the Model Context Protocol (MCP), but the natural-language metadata used to describe those tools creates a prompt-injection surface. Within this established tool-poisoning surface, we study Log-To-Leak, an additive post-hoc logging attack that induces a separate attacker-controlled call after the final legitimate call. Its payload targets the user query, MCP server name, server response, and agent response.
This automated digest uses the approved primary record identified below. The excerpt is abridged source text, rather than original reporting or an AI-written paraphrase.
FROM THE PRIMARY RECORD
Key details.
OFROOT / A PRACTICAL READING
Put it in perspective.
A record-specific starting point for deciding what to investigate. Source facts and OfRoot’s suggested questions have different roles.
- What changed
- The author-supplied record 10.48550/arxiv.2610.36108 makes an abstract and publication details available for “Log-To-Leak: Prompt Injection Attacks on Tool-Using LLM Agents via the Model Context Protocol”. [2]
- Who should review it